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. INTRODUCTION
This Article will examine the scope of due process rights afforded to
aliens' facing criminal prosecution for unauthorized return to the United
States after prior removal by immigration officials. Federal enforcement of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 2 is generally handled in
administrative court proceedings that are civil in nature.3 In addition to civil
enforcement, immigration violators are often subject to criminal
prosecution in federal court, This Article will specifically examine the
* Sam D'Amico Endowed Professor of Law and Nolan J., Edwards Professor of Law,
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center. The author wishes to thank her colleague,
Joseph Bockrath, for his support and encouragement, and Cody Reed, for his wonderful research
assistance. This Article is dedicated to the author's lifelong friend and staunchest supporter, Laura
L. Davenport.
1. The term "alien" is defined as "any person not a citizen or national of the United
States." 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(3) (2012).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
3. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) ("We have long recognized that
deportation is a particularly severe penalty, but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.
Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately related to
the criminal process." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4. See id.
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intersection between due process rights afforded to immigration violators
who are reconciling the dual impact of criminal and civil proceedings.
The United States is currently "home" to millions of aliens, including
over 11 million aliens who are present in the U.S. without authorization or
documentation.5 Notwithstanding their immigration status, aliens residing
in the United States remain subject to removal6  for being either
inadmissible7 or deportable. 8 The U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agency (ICE) annually removes over 300,000 aliens from the
United States.9 Many of these aliens impermissibly re-enter the country
without first obtaining consent from the United States Attorney General or
the United States Secretary of Homeland Security. '
Aliens who were previously removed return to the United States at
great risk of criminal prosecution by federal law enforcement agencies.
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)," it is a criminal offense punishable by
imprisonment for up to two years to effect unauthorized return to the United
5. Jeffery S. Passel et al., Population Decline of Unauthorized Immigration Stalls, May
Have Reversed, PEW REs. CENTER (Sept. 23, 2013),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stalls-
may-have-reversed/.
6. See United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 227 F.3d 476, 479 n.2 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Before
IIRIRA's [Illegal Immigration and Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996] enactment
in 1996, individuals such as Lopez-Vasquez who were ineligible for admission into the United
States and were never admitted into the United States were referred to as excludable, while aliens
who had gained admission, but later became subject to expulsion from the United States, were
referred to as deportable.... In addition, the IIRIRA has done away with the previous legal
distinction among deportation, removal, and exclusion proceedings. Now, the term removal
proceedings refers to proceedings applicable to both inadmissible and deportable aliens."
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7. Aliens who seek admission to the United States are subject to the provisions of 8 U.S.C.
1182.
8. Aliens admitted to the United States are subject to the deportation provisions of 8
U.S.C. § 1227.
9. See ICE, Fiscal Year 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/ (last visited June 27, 2014).
10. See Peter A. Schulkin, The Revolving Door: Deportations of Criminal Illegal
Immigrants, CTR. FOR IMMIOR. STUo. (Nov. 2012), http:/icis.org/revolving-door-deportations-of-
criminal-illegal-immigrants. In 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) was
incorporated as an agency within the newly formed Department of Homeland Security and
renamed the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. Our History, U.S. CrrTZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated May 25, 2011), http://www.uscis.gov/about-usiour-history.
11. Section 1326(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who-
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the
United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and
thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, ....
shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012).
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States.12 Section 1326 is unlike most immigration statutes. Section
1326(d)13  provides that aliens can, under prescribed and limited
circumstances, collaterally attack the validity of the underlying removal
order that serves as a predicate element of the § 1326(a) offense. 4
Criminal prosecution and incarceration for previously removed aliens
who return to the United States without authorization represent a
"significant chunk of all criminal enforcement actions." 15 Prosecution of
removed aliens for re-entry is one of the most frequent immigration charges
imposed on aliens in federal courts.' 6 From 2008-2010, 33.83% of aliens
charged in federal courts were indicted for re-entry.17 This rising surge of §
1326(a) prosecutions has caught the attention of at least one district circuit.
In United States v. Boliero, a Massachusetts district court noted that "[i]t
has not, however, escaped this [c]ourt's notice that prosecutions for illegal
reentry have been initiated against about twenty-three percent of the
criminal defendants whose prosecutions have commenced in federal district
courts over the past three years."' 8
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Mendoza-Lopez held that an alien being prosecuted under § 1326(a) for
illegal re-entry following a previous order of removal may collaterally
12. Id,
13. Section 1326(d) provides, in pertinent part, that:
In a criminal proceeding under this section, an alien may not challenge the validity of
the deportation order described in subsection (a)(1) ... or subsection (b) . .. unless the
alien demonstrates that-
(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to
seek relief against the order;
(2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the
alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and
(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.
Id, § 1326(d).
14. Id.
15. United States v. Boliero, 923 F. Supp. 2d 319, 335 (D. Mass. 2013); see also Surge in
Immigration Prosecutions Continues, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Junc 17,
2008), http://trac.syr.edulimmigrationreports/188/ (noting that illegal reentry was "the most
frequent recorded lead charge" for immigration prosecutions in U.S. District Courts during March
2008).
16. See MARK MOTIVANS, US. DEP'T JUST., IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2010, at 6 (Doris J. James & Jill Thomas eds., 2012), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iofjsl0.pdf.
17. Id. at 17 tbl.2.
18. Boliero, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (citing Table D-2: US, District Courts-Criminal
Defendants Commenced, by Offense, During the 12-Month Periods Ending June 30, 2008
Through 2012, U.S. CTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederaliudiciary/2012/june/D
02DJunI2.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2014)).
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attack the legality of the prior removal order.' 9 Although the legislative
history of § 1326 did not reveal a congressional intent to give aliens the
opportunity to collaterally attack the validity of a prior removal order, the
Court held that "where a determination made in an administrative
proceeding is to play a critical role in the subsequent imposition of a
criminal sanction, there must be some meaningful review of the
administrative proceedings."
After the Mendoza-Lopez decision, Congress incorporated the
concerns expressed by the Court into the amended language of § 1326 by
adding subsection (d). 2 1 Section 1326(d) provides, in pertinent part, that an
alien seeking judicial review of an underlying deportation order must
demonstrate that: "(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that
may have been available to [challenge] the order; (2) the deportation
proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of
the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was
fundamentally unfair." 2 2
Following the passage of § 1326(d), federal circuit courts became
divided regarding whether the failure to advise an alien of the right to
appeal the removal order in federal court improperly deprives the alien of
the opportunity for judicial review such that the order can be collaterally
attacked in a criminal proceeding. The Eighth Circuit is the only federal
circuit that imposes "an affirmative obligation on the government to advise
an alien effectively of. .. her right to judicial review of deportation
proceedings if the government wants to use the deportation later to prove a
criminal offense." 2 4
The Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted the contrary position
that "general explanations at the conclusion of a deportation hearing
advising the alien of his right to appeal the deportation order satisfy
Mendoza-Lopez and provide the alien with notice of his appellate rights
sufficient to satisfy due process." 2 5 The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and
19. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 829, 837-839 (1987), superseded in
part by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
20. Id. at 837-38 (citing Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1946); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944)).
21. United States v. Rcyes-Bonilla, 671 F,3d 1036, 1043 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Through the
addition of subsection (d) to [8 U.S.C. § 1326] in 1996, Congress partially codified the Court's
decision inMendoza-Lopez."), cert denied, 133 S. Ct 322 (2012).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2012).
23. See infra Part IV.
24. United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cit. 1989).
25. United States v. Lopez-Solis, 503 F. App'x 942, 945-46 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(citing United States v. Escobar-Garcia, 893 F.2d 124, 126 (6th Cir. 1990)).
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Tenth Circuits have not expressly ruled on whether an alien defendant is
entitled to notice of the right to a judicial appeal.
This Article will attempt to reconcile this conflicting interpretation of
Mendoza-Lopez, and seek to determine whether the Fifth Amendment
requires disclosure of the availability of judicial review to aliens facing
removal from the United States before the removal order can be used as a
predicate element of a criminal offense. The opportunity for judicial review
must, however, be the result of a considered and intelligent understanding
of the remedies available to the alien following the disclosure of such
information by immigration officials.
II. ENACTMENT OF § 1326(D)
In 1893, the United States Supreme Court clearly established that the
Constitution offers no protection to an alien facing removal from the United
States. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court held that an "order of
deportation is not a punishment for crime, It is not a banishment, in the
sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from
his country by way of punishment." 27 As such, the Court continued, aliens
subject to deportation have not "been deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law, and the provisions of the [C]onstitution,
securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application."28
Notwithstanding the lack of substantive due process rights, both
Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized limited procedural due
process rights for aliens in removal proceedings. The Fifth Amendment'S 29
procedural due process guarantees apply to citizens, lawful resident aliens,
and undocumented aliens. 30 Although the Supreme Court has not identified
all of the procedural safeguards that must be afforded to aliens in removal
proceedings, it is clear that all aliens in removal proceedings are entitled to
some procedural safeguards. 3' The due process protections afforded to
26. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
27. Id.
28. Id
29. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
"[njo person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
30. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77(1976).
31. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ("[Ajliens who
have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings
conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law."); United
States v. Fernandez-Antonia, 278 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Although the Supreme Court has
not specifically delineated the procedural safeguards to be accorded aliens in deportation or
2014] 95
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aliens in removal proceedings require that aliens "be provided (1) notice of
the charges against [them], (2) a hearing before an executive or
administrative tribunal, and (3) a fair opportunity to be heard."32 Paramount
in any due process determination is the question of whether a person
received meaningful notice of the rights and remedies afforded to her.
The question, then, transitions to the scope of due process protections
afforded to aliens when an order of deportation serves as a predicate
element for a criminal prosecution. As originally codified, § 276 (now
codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1326) of the INA created a nexus between
immigration law and criminal law by subjecting aliens unlawfully present
in the United States, following prior removal, to criminal penalties and
incarceration. 3 3 The intersection of both immigration law and criminal law
led to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez to
embed procedural due process rights granted to aliens in removal
proceedings into the criminal prosecution of § 1326 offenses.34 In Mendoza-
Lopez, the Court held that a defendant may collaterally attack an order of
deportation on due process grounds where the order becomes an element of
a criminal offense.35 The Court noted that where administrative proceedings
"play a critical role in the subsequent imposition of a criminal sanction,
there must be some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding."3 6
As originally enacted in 1952, § 1326(a) provided that any alien who
had been deported and subsequently re-enters or attempts to re-enter the
United States "shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, be
removal hearings, it is well settled that the procedures employed must satisfy due process." (citing
Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 212)).
32. United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597-98 (1953)); see also Smith v. United States, Nos. 10-21507-
Civ-COOKE, 09-20952-Cr-COOKE, 2011 WL 837747, at *6 n.5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2011)
("Because removal hearings are civil in nature, the due process protections afforded to aliens are
less than those afforded to a criminal defendant."). The due process guarantees afforded to
criminal defendants are significantly greater than those afforded to aliens in removal proceedings.
See Skilling v. United States, 561 US. 358, 402-03 (2010) ("To satisfy due process, 'a penal
statute [must] define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 357 (1983)).
33. immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 276, 66 Stat. 163, 229 (1952).
34. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 832-33, 838-39 (1987),
superseded in part by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
35. Id. at 838-39.
36. Id. at 837-38 (emphasis omitted) ("This principle means at the very least that where the
defects in an administrative proceeding foreclose judicial review of that proceeding, an alternative
means of obtaining judicial review must be made available before the administrative order may be
used to establish conclusively an element of a criminal offense,").
96 [Vol. 56:9 1
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punished by imprisonment of not more than two years, or by a fine of not
more than $1,000, or both."37 Following the enactment of § 1326, many
aliens facing incarceration for returning to the United States after removal
sought to collaterally attack the underlying deportation order in the criminal
proceeding. A growing conflict among the federal circuits arose regarding
whether an alien defendant could collaterally attack a deportation order.38 In
1987, the issue was finally resolved by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v, Mendoza-Lopez.3 9 In Mendoza-Lopez, Justice Marshall,
writing for the majority, examined the legislative history of § 1326 and
concluded that "the text and background of § 1326 thus indicate no
congressional intent to sanction challenges to deportation orders in
proceedings under § 1326."" Upon failing to find an express congressional
authorization for collateral attacks to a prior deportation order within the
text or legislative history of § 1326, the Court examined the issue within the
framework of the constitutional due process safeguards guaranteed to
defendants in criminal proceedings.4 Justice Marshall, in dictum, expressed
reservations about the use of prior deportation orders as predicate elements
of a § 1326 offense. Notwithstanding the due process safeguards
identified by the Court's holding, Justice Marshall noted that "the use of the
result of an administrative proceeding to establish an element of a criminal
offense is troubling," 43
Justice Marshall's concerns are reflected in the Court's decision." The
holding in Mendoza-Lopez increased the standard imposed on the
prosecution of a § 1326 violation.45 The Court noted that the nexus between
possible criminal sanctions arising from a violation of an administrative
immigration statute warrants "some meaningful review of the
administrative proceeding."4 6 As a result, the Court crafted a new standard
to provide alien defendants with due process rights that were previously
absent from the then-existing version of § 1326.
The meaningful-review standard established by Mendoza-Lopez
requires that "an alternative means of obtaining judicial review must be
made available before the administrative order may be used to establish
37. Inunigration and Nationality Act, § 276.
38. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 832-33.
39. Id
40. Id at 837.
41. Id
42. Id. at 838 n.15.
43. Id (citing United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 179 (1952) (Jackson, J,, dissenting)).
44. Id
45. Id at 838.
46. Id (citing Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1946); Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944)).
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conclusively an element of a criminal offense."47 The absence of a clearly
articulated standard for determining when an alien defendant suffered a
deprivation of the right to judicial review created a significant barrier to an
alien's ability to address a deprivation of due process rights. While not
"enumerat[ing] which procedural errors are so fundamental that they may
functionally deprive the alien of judicial review,"48 the facts in Mendoza-
Lopez identified two possible procedural defects.
First, the immigration judge failed to explain the aliens' right to
suspension of deportation or right to appeal.49 Second, the immigration
judge accepted the aliens' waiver of their right to appeal.50 The Court held
that waivers of appellate rights that were not "considered or intelligent"
deprive aliens of judicial review of their prior deportation proceedings.
The Court noted that "[t]he [i]mmigration [j]udge permitted waivers of the
right to appeal that were not the result of considered judgments by [the
aliens], and failed to advise [the aliens] properly of their eligibility to apply
for suspension of deportation." 52
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Mendoza-Lopez and the
first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, Senator Bob Dole
introduced a bill entitled the "Comprehensive Terror Prevention Act of
1995" before the United States Senate.53 That bill would eventually become
the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996."" The bill
easily passed through Congress and was signed by then-President Bill
Clinton approximately one year later on April 24, 1996." Senator Orin
Hatch noted when introducing the bill that it was designed to "strengthen
our counterterrorism efforts."5 In addition to modifying immigration laws,
the bill was intended "to give our law enforcement officials and courts the
tools they need to remove alien terrorists from our midst.""
After Mendoza-Lopez, Congress incorporated concerns expressed in
that opinion into the amended language of § 1326 by adding subsection
47. Id. at 838-39. The Supreme Court in Mendoza-Lopez held that "[d]ue process requires
that a collateral challenge to the use of a deportation proceeding as an element of a criminal
offense be permitted where the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of the alien
to obtain judicial review." Id. at 829.
48. Id. at 839 n.17.
49. See id. at 839.
50. Id. at 840.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 141 CONG. REC 14,654 (1995).
54. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996).
55. See id.
56. See 141 CONG. REC. 11,408 (1995).
57. Id. at 11,409.
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(d)." Section 1326(d) provides, in pertinent part, that an alien seeking
judicial review of an underlying deportation order must demonstrate the
following: "(1) The alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may
have been available to [challenge] the order; (2) the deportation proceedings
at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the
opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was
fundamentally unfair."59
III. JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOLLOWING A REMOVAL ORDER
Aliens who are removed frequently return to the United States without
obtaining prior consent or authorization from the Attorney General or
Secretary of Homeland Security.60 In the event that the aliens are
apprehended after returning, they may be arrested and prosecuted." "[T]he
Fifth Amendment requires only that, '[a]n indictment returned by a legally
constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . . if valid on its face, is enough to
call for trial of the charges on the merits.' 62
An alien faced with criminal prosecution for violating § 1326(d) may
file a motion to dismiss the indictment.6 This is an unusual motion.
"[G]enerally, courts lack authority to review either the competency or
sufficiency of evidence which forms the basis of an indictment and may not
quash indictments when the errors which produce them, such as
prosecutorial misconduct or violation of a statute, do not affect substantial
rights."M In Mendoza-Lopez, relying upon due process considerations, the
Supreme Court carved out an exception to this rule for challenges initiated
by alien defendants to the crimes raised under § 1326. An alien defendant
must satisfy all three prongs of § 1326 to raise a successful collateral attack
and obtain a dismissal of the criminal indictment.
58. United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1043 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Through the
addition of subsection (d) to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 in 1996, Congress partially codified the Court's
decision in Mendoza-Lopez.").
59. 8 U.S.C. 1326(d) (2012).
60. See MOTIVANS, supra note 16, at 6.
6 1. Id.
62. United States v. Munoz-Giron, 943 F. Supp. 2d 613, 619 (E.D. Va. 2013) (alterations in
original) (citing United States v. Mills, 995 F,2d 480, 487 (4th Cir. 1993)).
63. E.g., id.
64. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 831 n.2 (1987), superseded in part by
statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No, 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996).
66. United States v. El Shami, 434 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Martinez-Rocha, 337 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2003), United States v. Roque-Espinoza, 338 F.3d
724, 728 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Barba, No. 3:08-CR-46, 2009 WL 1586793, at *5 (E.D.
2014] 99
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The first prong of § 1326 requires an alien defendant to prove that all
available administrative remedies to challenge the prior order of removal
were exhausted. Generally, aliens do not assert that they were unaware of
available administrative remedies. Section 1229a(c)(5) provides that upon
issuance of an order of removal, "the judge shall inform that alien of the
right to appeal the decision." 6 8 The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
similarly provides that "the immigration judge must inform the alien of his
right to appeal the disposition." 9 Administrative remedies would include
filing a motion to reopen, 70 a motion for reconsideration,n or a cancellation
of removal made by the Attorney General.72 An alien may also appeal a
removal order through administrative proceedings by filing an appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
The second prong of § 1326, as well as the holding in Mendoza-Lopez,
requires that an alien defendant prove that due process deficiencies in the
prior deportation proceedings "amount to a complete deprivation of judicial
review of the deportation determination before the determination c[an] be
collaterally attacked." 74 A judicial appeal is only appropriate after an alien
has exhausted all available administrative remedies. 5 Following entry of a
final order of removal, an alien may pursue a limited number of judicial
options. Section 1252(a)(5) provides, in pertinent part, that the "sole and
exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal" is a "petition
for review filed with [the] appropriate court of appeals."" Alien defendants
facing prosecution under § 1326 often assert that the immigration judge
who presided over their removal proceedings, the immigration attorney
representing the government, or their own attorney failed to inform them of
Tenn. June 3, 2009); United States v. Gallegos-Cosio, 363 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392 (N.D.N.Y. 2005)
("Because § 1326(d) is conjunctive, a defendant must satisfy all three of its provisions before he
may wage a collateral attack.").
67. El Shami, 434 F.3d at 663, This Article will focus specifically on the second prong of §
1326(d).
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5) (2012) provides that "[i]f the immigration judge decides that the
alien is removable and orders the alien to be removed, the judge shall inform the alien of the right
to appeal that decision and of the consequences for failure to depart under the order of removal,
including civil and criminal penalties." Id.
69. El Shani, 434 F.3d at 663 n.6 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 242.26 (1993) (current version at 8
C.F.R. § 1240.48 (2014)).
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).
71. Id. § 1229a(c)(6).
72. Id. § 1229b.
73. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(a) (2014).
74. United States v. Lopcz-Solis, 503 F. App'x 942, 944-45 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
76. Id, § 1252(a)(5).
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their right to judicial review. An examination of the consequences
resulting from the failure to notify an alien defendant of this right has
resulted in a significant body of divergent jurisprudence. Federal courts
have grappled with determining whether due process considerations require
immigration judges and attorneys to inform aliens in removal proceedings
of their right to seek judicial review of a final removal order. "
To satisfy due process guarantees, § 1229a(c)(5) expressly mandates
that immigration judges must inform an alien that she has a right to appeal
an order of removal.79 As provided in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38, "[d]ecisions of
[i]mmigration [j]udges may be appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals." 8'0 The same notice mandate does not, however, apply to
notification that an alien has the right to pursue a judicial review of a
removal order."8 The question of whether an immigration judge has an
obligation to inform aliens of their right to judicial review has resulted in a
split within the federal circuits. 8 2 A majority of the circuits hold that
immigration judges and attorneys are not required to inform aliens of their
right to judicial review.83 However, one circuit has adopted a contrary
position and affirmatively requires immigration officials to provide aliens
with notice of their right to appeal to federal courts to satisfy due process
concerns. 84
IV. SPLIT [N THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
Following the passage of § 1326(d), federal circuit courts became
divided regarding whether the failure to advise an alien of the right to
judicial review of a removal order improperly deprives the alien of the
opportunity for judicial review such that the order can be collaterally
attacked in a criminal proceeding. The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit that
requires an immigration official to inform an alien of the right to seek
judicial review of deportation proceedings.
77. See infra Part IV.
78. See infra Part IV.
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5).
80. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(a) (2014),
81. See infra Part IV.
82. United States v. Vasquez-Montalban, 263 F. App'x 822, 825 (11th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) ("There is a split in the circuits as to whether immigration officials must inform aliens in
removal proceedings of their right to review in federal courts.").
83. See infra Part IV.
84, See infra Part TV.A.
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A. Eighth Circuit
In a case decided two years after the Mendoza-Lopez decision and
before the passage of § 1326(d), the Eighth Circuit addressed the notice
requirement imposed on immigration judges presiding over removal
proceedings. In United States v. Santos- Vanegas, an alien defendant facing
criminal prosecution for unlawful re-entry into the United States filed a
motion to "suppress evidence of [his] prior deportation."8 Santos-Vanegas
argued that the immigration judge failed to advise him of his right to
judicial appeal of the deportation order. 86 Santos-Vanegas, who represented
himself, "spoke no English and could not read or write in any language."
The immigration judge did inform the alien defendant "of his right to
appeal the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals," and the alien
did, in fact, file an administrative appeal.88 However, Santos-Vanegas
argued that notice of the right to only an administrative appeal was
insufficient, stating that "[n]either. . . the [immigration judge n]or anyone
else [had] earlier advised him of any opportunity to appeal beyond the
administrative level." 89
The Eighth Circuit focused on the lack of both written and oral
notification during the prior removal proceeding.9" The written notification
that Santos-Vanegas's removal was imminent "did not in any way indicate
that he could pursue flurther appeal in the federal courts."9) Furthermore, it
was established that neither the immigration judge nor any immigration
official informed him of his ability to pursue such an appeal.92 After Santos-
Vanegas illegally returned to the United States, he was charged with
85. United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 248 (8th Cir. 1989); see also United
States v. Rodriguez, 420 F.3d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 2005) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (questioning the
Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the actions of the immigration judge presiding over the
deportation hearing afforded sufficient due process to the alien defendant). The dissent vigorously
argued that apprising alien defendants of their right to pursue administrative remedies alone is not
sufficient to satisfy the obligation to adequately advise aliens of their rights. Rodriguez, 420 F.3d
at 835. The dissenting judge noted that "[a]t no point in the hearing, however, did the
[immigration judge] inform Rodriguez or the other respondents that they would have the right to
judicial review, as opposed to administrative review." Id. The dissent argued that the immigration
judge's duty was heightened by the fact that Rodriguez was not represented by counsel, and "[t]he
failure of the [immigration judge] to inform Rodriguez of his right to appeal to the federal courts
before accepting his waiver of his right to appeal was sufficient in itself to deprive Rodriguez of
an opportunity for meaningful review." Id. at 835-36.
86, Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d at 248.
87. Id at 249.
88. Id
89. Id. at 248, 250.
90. See id. at 251.
91. Id. at 250.
92. Id.
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violating § 1326.93 The Eighth Circuit, quoting Mendoza-Lopez, noted that
an alien may successfully collaterally attack a prior deportation order by
"us[ing] a deportation proceeding as an element of a criminal offense ...
where the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of the
alien to obtain judicial review."94
In Santos-Vanegas, in addition to the language and educational
barriers faced by Santos-Vanegas, the Eighth Circuit noted the short
temporal interval between the BIA's dismissal of his appeal and his
deportation.95 This short time span also inhibited Santos-Vanegas from
properly raising a defense.96 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit held that the
Mendoza-Lopez decision "establishes an affirmative obligation on the
government to advise an alien effectively of his or her right to judicial
review of deportation proceedings if the government wants to use the
deportation later to prove a criminal offense."97
B. Second and Ninth Circuits
The Second and the Ninth Circuits follow the majority view and do not
require immigration officials to advise aliens of their right to pursue judicial
review of a removal order in federal court.98 Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court in Mendoza-Lopez did not identify which fundamental procedural
errors in removal proceedings would deprive aliens of judicial review,99 but
both circuits have identified procedural errors that occur in removal
proceedings that result in due process deprivations.
93. Id.
94. See id. (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481
U.S. 828, 839 (1987), superseded in part by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat, 1214 (1996)).
95. Id. at 251.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. United States v. Gonzalez-Villalobos, 724 F.3d 1125, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Lopez, 445 F.3d 90, 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2006). One district court in the Third Circuit has
criticized the Ninth Circuit's more expansive application of § 1326(d)(2), noting that "[t]he Ninth
Circuit's approach essentially collapses the first and second prongs of [§] 1326(d) into a general
fairness inquiry, by applying the same analysis to the exhaustion requirement and to whether the
defendant was deprived of judicial review." Davis v. United States, Civil Action No. 06-cv-04079,
Criminal Action No. 03-cr-484, 2007 WL 3342407, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2007) (citing United
States v. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2001)).
99. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839 n.17
100. Lopez, 445 F.3d at 96. The Ninth Circuit has held that "[a]n immigration official's
failure to advise an alien of his eligibility for relief from removal, including voluntary departure,
violates his due process rights." United States v. Garcia-Santana, 743 F.3d 666, 671 (9th Cir.
2014) (citing United States v. Melendez-Castro, 671 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)).
2014] 103
104 SouTH TEXAS LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 56:91
The Ninth Circuit has taken an expansive approach to determine
whether procedural deficiencies in removal proceedings improperly
deprived alien defendants of their opportunity for judicial review. As
provided in § 1229a(c)(5), an immigration judge must inform alien
defendants of their right to take an administrative appeal of a removal order
to the BIA.'01 This mandatory requirement is routinely examined when
determining whether alien defendants have satisfied the first prong of §
1326(d)(1), which requires that they exhaust "any administrative remedies"
available before seeking relief from the removal order,10 2
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Gonzalez-Villalobos, held that
failure to inform alien defendants of their right to an administrative appeal
can satisfy § 1326(d)(2), which provides that the removal proceeding
cannot improperly deprive alien defendants of the opportunity for judicial
review.' 03 The Ninth Circuit found that § 1326(d)(2) can be satisfied under
circumstances where "alien[s] who fail[ ] to exhaust [their] administrative
remedies due to an error in the underlying proceedings, satisfying (d)(1),
will typically also be deprived of the opportunity for judicial review, [thus]
satisfying (d)(2)."'04 A similar decision was reached in United States v.
Rojas-Pedroza, where the court held that:
[T]he same failure to inform an alien regarding "apparent
eligibility" for relief also "deprive[s] the alien of the opportunity
for judicial review" . . . because "an alien who is not made aware
that he has a right to seek relief necessarily has no meaningful
opportunity to appeal the fact that he was not advised of that
right., 105
The Second Circuit adopted the majority position "[t]hat there is no
stand-alone right to notice of the availability of judicial review."' 0 6 Relying
upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Mendoza-Lopez, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that criminal prosecutions which rely upon "the use of an
administrative determination reached in the absence of important
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(a) (2014).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1).
103. Gonzalez- Villalobos, 724 F.3d at 1130 (citing United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d
1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir.
2004)).
104. Id. (citing United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004)).
105. United States v. Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d 1253, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 2013) (second
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000)), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 805 (2013).
106. United States v. Lopez, 445 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2006),
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constitutional safeguards as an element of a crime is 'troubling."' 0 7 To
combat the "troubling" nature of § 1326, the Supreme Court in Mendoza-
Lopez held that providing a defendant with the opportunity for judicial
review in the first instance "legitimate[s] such a practice.,o
Notwithstanding its concerns, the Second Circuit stated that "[n]othing
in Mendoza-Lopez, however, indicates that this principle requires a right to
notice about the availability of judicial review."109 The position adopted by
the Second Circuit did not foreclose the ability to collaterally attack a
deportation order under § 1326(d)(2) for deprivation of an opportunity for
judicial review. In the Second Circuit, collateral challenges raised under §
1326(d)(2) for deprivation of the opportunity for judicial review can be
brought in a number of ways. For example, procedural errors in the removal
proceedings have been recognized as grounds for establishing that an alien
defendant was deprived of judicial review.' 10
In United States v. Turner, the district court relied upon a procedural
defect to acknowledge a possible deprivation of the opportunity for judicial
review when an alien was subject to a deportation order entered in
absentia.' The alien argued "that he was never served with the Order to
Show Cause . . . , never received notice of the deportation hearing in
immigration court, and did not know he was going to [be] deported until the
Government actually deported him."" 2 The district court ordered an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant received proper
notice of his deportation hearing:
But should [the alien] be able to locate and present persuasive
evidence of lack of notice to the [clourt, the [c]ourt has little doubt
that such evidence would also establish that [the alien] was denied
an opportunity for judicial review. . . . If it is true that [the alien]
did not know-and had no reason to know-that he would be
deported before he was actually deported on August 5, 1992, then
[the alienj could not have been expected to seek judicial review-
through any means-before August 5, 1992." 3
107, Id. at 95 (quoting United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 838 n.15 (1987),
superseded in part by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, i10 Stat. 1214 (1996)).
108. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 838 n.15.
109. Lopez, 445 F.3d at 95.
110. See, e.g., id. at 96 ("We turn to the question of whether judicial review was realistically
available to [the alien defendant]-that is, whether defects in the administrative proceeding
otherwise foreclosed judicial review." (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(2) (2006))).
Il. United States v. Turner, No. 3:08cr34 (MRK), 2010 WL 6634571, at *9-10 (D. Conn.
Dec. 10, 2010).
112. Id. at *8.
113. Id. at *10 (citing United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 67-69 (2d Cir. 2004)).
2014] 105
SOUTH TEXAS LA wREVIEW
One district court in the Second Circuit has also recognized that alien
defendants can suffer deprivation of an opportunity for judicial review
where "legal uncertainties regarding the availability of review may render
judicial review of a deportation proceeding unavailable to an alien."" 4 In
United States v. Etienne, the district court attributed the alien's delay to
open questions regarding his eligibility for § 212(c) relief "5 The alien's
"ability to access review of his deportation order was compromised by the
state of the law at the time of his confinement prior to deportation."' 16
Finally, denial of the opportunity for judicial review under §
1326(d)(2) can be demonstrated in the Second Circuit upon a showing that
the alien received ineffective assistance of counsel." 7 In United States v.
Perez, the Second Circuit held that "[d]eprivation of the opportunity for
judicial review can be established by demonstrating ineffective assistance
of counseL'"' 8 In Perez, United States v. Cerna, and Etienne, the courts
held that the respective attorneys' failure to file an application for § 212(c)
relief was "clear evidence of incompetence,""l 9 which resulted in a finding
that under § 1326(d)(2) the aliens were denied the opportunity for judicial
review. 120
C. Majority Circuits: Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted the position that
"general explanations at the conclusion of a deportation hearing advising
the alien of his right to appeal the deportation order satisfy Mendoza-Lopez
and provide the alien with notice of his appellate rights sufficient to satisfy
due process."' 2 ' These federal circuits are in agreement that due process
114. United States v. Etienne, No. CRIM.3-03-CR-190 JCH, 2005 WL 165384, at *4 (D.
Conn. Jan. 14, 2005) (citing Copeland, 376 F.3d at 69).
115. See id. at *5.
116. Id.
117. United States v. Outram, 445 F. App'x 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2011). Although recognizing
that the Second Circuit in United States v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2003) permitted an alien
defendant to raise a collateral attack based upon an ineffective assistance of counsel argument, the
Third Circuit distinguished the facts of Outram from Perez. Id. at 515-16 (citing Perez, 330 F.3d
at 101 n.3, 103 n.5).
118. Perez, 330 F.3d at 101.
119, Etienne, 2005 WL 165384, at *6.
120. United States v. Cerna, 603 F.3d 32, 40 (2d Cir. 2010); Perez, 330 F.3d at 101-02;
Etienne, 2005 WL 165384, at *6.
121. United States v. Lopez-Solis, 503 F. App'x 942, 946 (1lth Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(citing United States v. Escobar-Garcia, 893 F.2d 124, 126 (6th Cir. 1990)); United States v.
Munoz-Giron, 943 F. Supp. 2d 613, 621 (E.D. Va. 2013).
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considerations do not require immigration officials "to advise an alien of
the right to judicial review of a deportation or removal order." 22
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the position held by the Second Circuit
that immigration officials are not under an obligation to "specifically
inform [an alien] about the availability of judicial review." 2 3 The Eleventh
Circuit held that "[w]e agree with the Second Circuit's persuasive holding
that, in an ordinary case, the receipt of a final order of removal puts an alien
on notice to look for remedies of that order."1 24
In Lopez-Solis, the alien defendant appeared pro se during the removal
hearing.125 The immigration judge who presided over the removal hearing
"informed Lopez-Solis that he had the right to appeal the decision to 'a
higher court."" 6 The immigration judge also informed Lopez-Solis that he
could appeal to the BIA, which he did, but Lopez-Solis later argued that "he
was unaware that he had a right to have the federal courts review his
removal order." 27 The Eleventh Circuit held that Lopez-Solis "did receive
a general notice of his right to appeal and was able to appeal to the BIA."12 9
The court further noted that "Lopez-Solis expressed no confusion over the
[immigration judge]'s deportation order and its consequences," and "based
on the record, the [immigration judge] did not make any affirmative
misstatements that misled Lopez-Solis into believing that he could not
appeal to federal court." 1 29 As such, Lopez-Solis was not deprived of his
right to judicial review and could not raise a collateral attack to his
deportation order under § 1326(d). 3 0
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Escobar-Garcia similarly held
that "Mendoza-Lopez does not mandate the [immigration officer] to advise
an accused of a right to a 'judicial appeal.'" 3 ' Escobar-Garcia argued that
"he was deprived of procedural due process because the [immigration
122. Lopez-Solis, 503 F. App'x at 945-46 (citing United States v. Lopez, 445 F.3d 90, 95
(2d Cir. 2006); Escobar-Garcia, 893 F.2d at 126).
123, Id. at 947. Additionally, another court rejected the argument that a Spanish translation
of the waiver of removal deprived the alien of judicial review where the waiver's express
language "clearly advised him of his rights to a hearing as set forth in the Notice to Appear."
United States v. Estrada-Garcia, No. 13-14009-CR, 2013 WL 1621968, at *1, *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
10, 2013).
124. Lopez-Solis, 503 F. App'x at 946 (citing Lopez, 445 F.3d at 95).
125. Id at 943.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id at 946.
129. Id. (citing United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 831-32 (1987), superseded
in part by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996); United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F, 2d 247, 250-51 (8th Cir. 1989)).
130. Id. at 947,
131. United States v. Escobar-Garcia, 893 F.2d 124, 126 (6th Cir. 1990).
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officer] failed to advise him of his right to a 'judicial review' in each of his
earlier deportation decisions as opposed to generally informing him of a
'right to appeal' at the conclusion of the hearings." 3 The Sixth Circuit
made it clear that immigration officials are not required to specify that the
alien has a right to appeal to a federal court. 13 The Sixth Circuit noted that
the explanations at the conclusion of the deportation hearing "advising
Garcia of his right to appeal the deportation order satisfied Mendoza-Lopez
and provided him with due process of notice of his appellate rights."
One district court in the Fourth Circuit has followed the majority
position adopted by the Second Circuit in United States v. Lopez that
"'there is no stand-alone right to notice of the availability of judicial
review,"' as due process is not offended by the failure to provide notice of
judicial remedies that are readily available in case law and statutes.135
D. Circuits that Have not Addressed this Issue
The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have not expressly
ruled on whether alien defendants are entitled to notice of the right to
judicial appeal. In United States v. Luna, the First Circuit, noting "the
uncertainty in the law on this issue," declined to rule on whether § 1326(d)
(2) was violated.13 6 The court recognized that although the Mendoza-Lopez
analysis was incorporated into § 1326, Mendoza-Lopez falls short of
providing guidance as to identification of specific instances that warrant a
finding that circumstances within a deportation proceeding deprived an
alien defendant of the opportunity for judicial review. 37 The First Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court in Mendoza-Lopez "declined to further
'enumerate which procedural errors are so fundamental that they may
functionally deprive the alien of judicial review."' 13 8
In Luna, the government argued that the "availability of judicial
review through a writ of habeas corpus is fatal to [an alien's] claim under §




135. United States v. Munoz-Giron, 943 F. Supp. 2d 613, 621 (ED. Va. 2013) (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 445 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2006)).
136. United States v. Luna, 436 F.3d 312, 3 19 (1st Cir. 2006).
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839 (1987), superseded in
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federal circuits,140 but due to the "uncertainty in the law" under §
1326(d)(2), it ultimately limited its analysis to whether the alien
demonstrated "fundamental unfairness," i.e., the third prong of the
collateral attack test under § 1326(d)(3) 14' The First Circuit found that the
facts of this case did support a finding that the alien was deprived of an
opportunity for judicial review under § 1326(d)(2),1 42 since the immigration
judge "failed to inform Luna of his eligibility for § 212(c) relief, provide
him with an opportunity to apply for that relief, or adjudicate his application
for relief.,
143
The First Circuit could have relied on the holding of Mendoza-Lopez
to find that the immigration judge's failures were similar to the immigration
judge's failures in Mendoza-Lopez to "adequately explain the availability of
relief' to Mendoza-Lopez, resulting in a deprivation of that alien's
"opportunity for judicial review."'" Luna's possible ability to satisfy §
1326(d)(2) would have nevertheless been irrelevant to the disposition of the
case because the First Circuit held that Luna did not satisfy the third prong
of § 1326(d)(3).1 4 5 Since the elements of § 1326(d) are in the conjunctive,
the First Circuit found that "a defendant must satisfy all of them to
successfully attack his removal order." 46
The most recent consideration of § 1326 within the jurisdiction of the
First Circuit comes from the district court in United States v. Boliero.147 In
Boliero, the district court determined that the hearing officer "technically
informed" 43 the alien of her right to appeal; however, the district court
ultimately found that she was deprived of her opportunity for judicial
review.149 In this case, the court granted Boliero's motion to dismiss the
indictment for her purported violation of § 1326(a),' 50 The motion to
dismiss collaterally attacked the validity of a prior deportation proceeding,
which was entered as a result of a conviction that was later vacated.' 5'
140. Id.
141. Id. at 318-19 ("However, because we conclude that Luna has not established prejudice
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3), we need not ultimately resolve all the statutory issues.").
142. Id. at 321.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 319 (citing United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 842 (1987),
superseded in part by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)).
145. Id. at 319, 321.
146. Id. at 317.
147. United States v. Boliero, 923 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Mass. 2013).
148. Id. at 328.
149. Id. at 331.
150. Id. at 336.
151. Id. at 324.
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Boliero successfully argued that she was "prevented from exhausting
administrative remedies by due process violations, . . . [which] deprived her
of the opportunity for judicial review," and that she suffered prejudice from
the issuance of a fundamentally unfair deportation order. 52 The court's due
process analysis focused on the adequacy of the notice of Boliero's
appellate rights. 1 3 The court determined that Boliero was deprived of due
process protections because the "immigration court failed to advise her of
her right to appeal.""' Although the hearing officer "technically informed"
[Boliero] of her right to appeal, he did not indicate the urgency in which the
rights should be exercised. "5 The hearing officer only notified her "that she
could file an appeal," not that she "needed" to appeal.s'5 The court was
persuaded that a "hearing officer's statement at the start of a hearing that
[the defendant] had the right to appeal does not satisfy due process if notice
is not provided to the defendant that it is time to appeal."15 7 Having
established that the due process violations prevented Boliero from
exhausting her administrative remedies, the district court concluded that she
satisfied the first prong of the § 1326(d)(2).' 58 The court found that the
second prong of § 1326(d)(2) was also satisfied because "the same
violations have deprived her of the opportunity for judicial review."5
The Third Circuit has not expressly ruled on whether alien defendants
are entitled to notice of their right to judicial appeal. However, several
decisions indicate that the Third Circuit is willing to consider lack of notice
in determining whether a prior removal hearing deprived an alien of
procedural due process.160 In United States v. Charleswell, the Third Circuit
152. Id at 331, 336. In addition to asserting that she was denied due process, Boliero also
argued that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in the filing of her motion to reopen. Id
at 329. Generally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are made to support the first prong of a
§ 1326(d) collateral challenge. See id. at 329-30 (quoting United States v. Cerna, 603 F.3d 32, 42
(2d Cir. 2010)). However, this argument can also support a challenge under the second prong of
the § 1326 test because "[i]neffective assistance of counsel violates due process where 'the
proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting
his case."' Id. at 330 (quoting lannetta v. INS, 48 F.3d 1211, 1995 WL 86263, at *2 (1st Cir,
1995) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision)). The court adopted the Second Circuit's analysis
of due process deprivations resulting from ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.; see also
United States v. Cerna, 603 F.3d 32, 42-43 (2d Cir. 2010).
153. Boliero, 923 F Supp. 2d at 329 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b) (2013)).
154. Id. at 328.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 328-29.
157 Id. at 329.
158. Id. at 331.
159. Id
160. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 558 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2009) ("[Flailure to
notify counsel that counsel's client is facing removal proceedings has been found to deprive the
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considered this issue and concluded that alien defendants may raise
collateral attacks under § 1326(d)(2) based upon a lack of notice of
appellate rights combined with a misunderstanding of the law.' 61 Citing
United States v. Copeland from the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit in
Charleswell held that "where an alien is misled to believe that he has no
opportunity for judicial review, the lack of an affirmative notice of the right
to an appeal may combine to constitute a denial of the meaningful
opportunity for judicial review, satisfying both § 1326(d)(2) and Mendoza-
Lopez." 162
The Fifth Circuit has not held that immigration judges are required to
notify alien defendants of their right to challenge removal orders in federal
court. In addition to its recognition of the three-prong test set forth in §
1326(d) and the holding in Mendoza-Lopez, the Fifth Circuit requires that
alien defendants seeking to collaterally attack prior removal orders also
satisfy a three-prong test to determine whether due process deficiencies
were present in the prior removal proceeding.' 6' In United States v. Lopez-
Vasquez, the Fifth Circuit held that an "alien must establish that (1) the
prior hearing was 'fundamentally unfair'; (2) the hearing effectively
eliminated the right of the individual to challenge the hearing by means of
judicial review of the order; and (3) the procedural deficiencies caused the
individual actual prejudice." 64
One important factor underlying the Fifth Circuit's analysis is whether
the prior removal proceeding afforded the alien defendant with due process
protections.165 The Fifth Circuit in Lopez-Vasquez noted, however, that the
represented alien of meaningful judicial review." (citing United States v. Dorsett, 308 F. Supp. 2d
537, 543-44 (D.V.1. 2003))).
161. United States v, Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir, 2006) (citing United States v.
Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 68-69 (2d Cir. 2004)).
162. Id. (citing United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 68-69 (2d Cir. 2004)) ("Here, [the
alien defendant] appeared pro se and indicated his desire to contest the reinstatement order by
checking the appropriate box, He was never informed that he had relief beyond this box and its
corresponding statement. Consequently, the lack of any notice concerning his right to a direct
appeal in combination with the misleading nature of the explicit language of the reinstatement
order and the speed with which aliens are deported following a reinstatement process leads us to
conclude that he was effectively denied an opportunity to seek judicial review, thereby meeting
Mendoza-Lopez's second requirement." (emphasis omitted)).
163. United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 227 F,3d 476, 483 (5th Cir. 2000),
164. Id, at 483 (emphasis omitted); see also United States v. Segundo, No. 4:1 0-cr-0397,
2010 WL 4791280, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2010) (citing Lopez-Vasquez, 227 F.3d at 483).
165. Lopez-Vasquez, 227 F.3d at 484 (quoting United States v. Lara-Aceves, 183 F.3d 1007,
1011 (9th Cir, 1999), overruled by United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905 (9th Cir.
2001)).
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United States Supreme Court "has not enumerated the procedural
protections guaranteed to an alien in a deportation proceeding." 66
In United States v. Segundo, the district court granted the alien
defendant's motion to suppress a prior removal order and motion to dismiss
the indictment for "one count of illegal re-entry in violation of [§]
1326(a)."' 6 7 The district court focused its inquiry primarily on the
procedural errors in the prior removal hearing that prevented the alien
defendant from "being aware of, much less pursuing, judicial review" to
challenge the order of removal.' 68 The procedural errors in Segundo
"consisted of the failure to explain to [the alien defendant] his right to be
represented by counsel, his right to rebut and contest the charges against
him, and his right to petition for judicial review of the removal order, in
addition to the failure to translate this information into Spanish for him." 69
The district court concluded that these procedural errors were "so
fundamental that they functionally deprive[d]" the alien defendant of his
right to judicial review. 170
The Seventh Circuit has not ruled on this issue. However, an alien
defendant facing prosecution under § 1326 did argue that he was entitled to
a heightened level of notice during his deportation proceedings. In United
States v. Robledo-Gonzales, the alien defendant asserted that the
immigration judge's "failure to inform him of his right to petition for
judicial review of an adverse decision by the BIA effectively foreclosed his
right to judicial review." 17t The Seventh Circuit held that the availability of
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus precluded a finding that the alien
defendant was deprived of an opportunity for judicial review.17 2 In United
States v. Roque-Espinoza, the Seventh Circuit again held that the
availability-yet lack of filing-of a habeas petition precludes a finding
166. Id. (citing United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839, n.17 (1987),
superseded in part by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)); see also Animashaun v. INS, 990 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1993)
("To render a hearing unfair, the defect complained of must have been such as might have led to a
denial of justice, or there must have been absent one of the elements deemed essential to due
process." (citing Ka Fung Chan v. INS, 634 F.2d 248, 258 (5th Cir, 1981))); United States v.
Girosky-Garibay, 176 F. Supp, 2d 705, 710 (W.D. Tex. 2001) ("If one of the elements deemed
essential to due process is absent from the removal proceeding, then Defendant is denied due
process of law." (citing Animashaun, 990 F.2d at 238)).
167. Segundo, 2010 WL 4791280, at *1.
168. Id. at *9.
169. Id.
170. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at
839).
171. United States v. Robledo-Gonzales, 80 F. App'x 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2003).
172. Id. at 504.
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that an alien defendant was deprived of an opportunity for judicial
review. 173 The court noted that:
Even though [the alien defendant] may have had good reason for
thinking that he was not eligible for discretionary relief from
removal, because the [immigration judge] had so informed him,
he should have realized that avenues of judicial review were
available to him. Apart from a direct appeal to the court of appeals
from a BIA order finding him ineligible for § 212(c) relief, which
rnay have been possible, he could also have filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2241.4 1
The Tenth Circuit has not ruled on this issue. In United States v.
Varela-Cias, the alien defendant asked the court to adopt the Eighth
Circuit's analysis in Santos-Vanegas, and impose an obligation on
immigration judges to advise aliens of their right to appeal in federal
court."' Varela-Cias argued that he was denied the opportunity for judicial
review where the immigration judge "failed to inform him of his right to
file an appeal in federal court."176 The Tenth Circuit declined to address this
issue, noting that "Varela-Cias never argued in the district court that the
[immigration judge] should have informed him of his right to file an appeal
in federal court." 77
V. DUE PROCESS DEPRIVATIONS ARISING FROM LACK OF NOTICE
It is a long-standing axiom of both immigration and constitutional law
that aliens in removal proceedings are entitled to due process rights under
the Fifth Amendment.' 8 Due process guarantees require the government to
afford an alien with the "most basic procedural protections-notice and a
hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 79 The Supreme
Court established a framework in Mathews v. Eldridge to determine
173. United States v. Roque-Espinoza, 338 F.3d 724, 729 (7th Cir. 2003).
174. Id. (citing Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 351 (2001); Bosede v. Ashcroft, 309
F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002)).
175. United States v. Varela-Cias, 425 F. App'x 756, 760 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1989)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976); United States v. Gonzalez-Roque, 301 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Although the Supreme
Court has not specifically delineated the procedural safeguards to be accorded aliens in
deportation or removal hearings, it is well settled that the procedures employed must satisfy due
process." (quoting United States v. Fernandez-Antonia, 278 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2002))).
179. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Landon, 459 U.S. at 32-
33).
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whether due process deprivations occurred as a result of an administrative
proceeding.180 The Mathews factors are as follows:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.'
The first Mathews factor is easily satisfied. Removal proceedings are
brought under § 1229a. The Supreme Court in Bridges v. Wixon held that
aliens in removal proceedings have substantial liberty interests at stake.1 82
The Supreme Court has also provided that even undocumented aliens are
entitled to constitutional rights, 183 In Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court
recognized that "[e]ven one whose presence in this country is unlawful,
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.""
The second Mathews factor examines the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the alien's liberty interest.18 5 Without question, alien
defendants, due to a lack of notice of their right to appeal, are deprived not
only of their right to review the removal order in federal court but, more
importantly, are deprived of an opportunity to collaterally challenge the
prior removal order in subsequent criminal proceedings. As a result, alien
defendants are subject to both removal from the United States and
subsequent incarceration upon their unauthorized return to the United States
because neither the immigration judge nor immigration officials are
required to advise aliens of their right to appeal in federal court.
The risk of erroneous deprivations of due process for aliens in removal
proceedings is heightened by the demographics of this group. The Second
Circuit in United States v. Lopez argued that access to judicial remedies in
case law and statutes is readily available to aliens after removal orders are
entered.' 86 That argument is, however, a difficult one to make in light of
180. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
181. Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71(1970)).
182. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ("Though deportation is not technically a
criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to
stay and live and work in this land of freedom.").
183. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 77.
184. Id.
185. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
186. See United States v. Lopez, 445 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2006). In Lopez, the immigrationjudge failed to notify the alien defendant of his right to habeas corpus review, although he was
apprised of the right to appeal to the BIA. Id. at 95. The Second Circuit rejected the argument that
failure to give notice, standing alone, could serve as grounds for a due process attack. Id. at 96.
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demographic factors such as language, literacy, and unfamiliarity with the
American legal system.8 Additionally, the duration between entry of a
removal order and physical removal of an alien from the United States must
also be considered.' 88 The demographics of the alien population, coupled
with the complexity of the statutory framework of the INA and CFR and
ineffective or nonexistent legal representation clearly serve as barriers that
limit aliens' access to information about their legal remedies following
entry of a removal order.' 89
The final Mathews factor examines the potential administrative and
fiscal burdens on the government that could arise from providing notice to
aliens in removal proceedings that they have a right to appeal a removal
order in federal court.'" Clearly, the federal government has an interest in
strictly interpreting immigration statutes and preventing frivolous appeals.
As the Ninth Circuit opined in Lopez-Velasquez and Valencia v. Mukasey,
the government should not be obligated to inform aliens of "all possible
ways of obtaining relief' because "aliens would be encouraged to file
frivolous applications, burdening the immigration system and possibly
resulting in frivolousness determinations."1'c Although reducing possible
frivolous appeals in federal courts is certainly a laudable governmental
interest, the burden on immigration judges and immigration officials would
not be significant.
The Third Circuit in United States v. Charleswell questioned whether
the government has a legitimate reason to withhold notice of appellate
rights to aliens in removal proceedings. The Third Circuit noted that "[w]e
are simply unable to fathom or rationalize a legitimate reason why the
government would not want to fully inform aliens of their statutory right to
The court argued that "the receipt of a final order of deportation ordinarily would put an alien on
notice to look for remedies for that order." Id. at 95. The court further placed the burden on the
alien defendant to seek information about the avenues of relief available, stating that "where
judicial remedies are readily available in case law and statutes, due process is not offended where
no notice of those remedies is provided." Id. at 96.
187. See United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting United States
v. Nakhoul, 596 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (D. Mass. 1984)) (highlighting the aliens' argument that
waivers of their rights afforded by Miranda were not knowing and intelligent due to a lack of
"understanding of American law, customs and constitutional rights").
188. See Lopez, 445 F.3d at 97 (quoting United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir.
2004)).
189. See United States v, Cerna, 603 F.3d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) ("This case gives us
occasion once again to take note of the exceptionally poor quality of representation often provided
by attorneys retained by aliens as they attempt to negotiate the complexities of our immigration
law.").
190. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
191. United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2010); Valencia v.
Mukascy, 548 F.3d 1261, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 2008).
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appeal."' 92 Recognizing that effective notification is essential, the court
determined that "a sensibly easy way to cure this glaring deficiency" would
require a "slight change" in the forms and an amendment to the
immigration regulations.' 93
VI. CONCLUSION
The number of criminal prosecutions in federal court for aliens
returning to the United States following entry of a removal order is rising
dramatically. Although it is undisputed that aliens are afforded due process
right during removal proceedings, the lack of notice about available
remedies continues to deprive those aliens of any meaningful due process.
The Supreme Court and Congress have created an avenue for aliens to
collaterally challenge prior removal orders, but that remedy has been
rendered effectively meaningless by the federal government's unwillingness
to inform aliens of their statutory right to judicial review of the orders.
Immigration officials must certainly realize that aliens do not have realistic
opportunities to research case law and interpret complex immigration
statutes in search of remedies during the short time period between entry of
the removal order and actual departure from the United States. This
problem could easily be remedied by broadly interpreting the statutory
language in the fNA and CFR to impose an affirmative obligation on
immigration officials to notify aliens of both administrative and judicial
appellate rights.
192. United States v. Charleswell, 456 Rt3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2006).
193. Id.; see also Martinez-De Bojorquez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 2004)
("Finally, the additional burden imposed on the government in having to provide a warning
regarding the effect of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 is not substantial. While we do not decide what type of
warning would be appropriate under the circumstances because it is clear from the record that
notice was given to [the alien], we are confident that providing notice to a person such as [the
alien] would result in minimal cost to the government, Providing such notice, however, would go
a long way in remedying the inequities that the application of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 can cause.");
Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Requiring the government to alter slightly
its procedures in document fraud proceedings will achieve the desired effect-additional
safeguards-without visiting upon it any inordinate hardship. . . . Providing constitutionally
adequate notice requires only minor changes in the content of the forms themselves and equally
slight adaptions in the INS's method of presenting the forms.").
116 [Vol. 56:91
